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EVALUATING UNIONS: LABOR ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW
Michael J. Goldberg*
WHAT Do UNIONS Do?. By Richard B. Freeman and James L.
Medoff. New York: Basic Books. 1984. Pp. x, 293. $22.95.

The National Labor Relations Act 1 celebrated its fiftieth anniversary last year, and that milestone was marked by renewed speculation
about the future of the labor movement in this country. In terms of
relative size and influence, American unions have been in a state of
chronic decline for almost thirty years, and many people wonder
whether they are worth saving. What Do Unions Do?, an outstanding
empirical analysis of the role of unions in the American economy by
Harvard economists Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff,2 suggests that they are.
In reaching that conclusion, the authors ma.lee no effort to minimize the fact that recent times have been hard times for most unions.
For example, the percentage of private sector nonagricultural workers
represented by unions dropped from thirty-four percent in 1956 to
about twenty-four percent in 1980 (p. 221). 3 Union victories in National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) representation elections have
also fallen sharply, from a victory rate of sixty-five to seventy-five percent in the 1950s to about forty-five percent in the early 1980s (pp.
221-22). Not surprisingly, unions have suffered a commensurate loss
of political influence. In 1977 and 1978, for instance, the labor movement was unable to secure passage of a relatively modest Labor Law
• Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. A.B. 1971, Cornell University; J.D. 1975, Harvard Law School; LL.M. 1977, Georgetown University Law Center. - Ed. I
would like to thank Roger J. Dennis and Lea VanderVelde for their helpful comments on an
earlier draft.
1. The Act, as amended, is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
2. Freeman is Professor of Economics at Harvard University and Director of Labor Research at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Medoff is also on the economics faculty at
Harvard and is a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research.
3. Unfortunately, I found Freeman and Medoff's discussion of the percentage of the
workforce represented by unions to be uncharacteristically imprecise. They cite figures for percentages of workers "organized" without specifying whether they mean workers who are repre·
sented by unions or the somewhat smaller percentage of workers who actually belong to unions.
Nevertheless, the authors are quite correct that union strength, however measured, has drastically declined. According to the Bureau of National Affairs, the percentage of the civilian
workforce who are union members dropped from about 30% in 1950 to 20.9% in 1980 and then
to "a new, modem-era low of 17.9% in 1982." BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, UNIONS TODAY: NEW TACTICS TO TACKLE TOUGH TIMES 7 (1985).
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Reform Bill4 in spite of the fact that the Democratic Party controlled
the White House and both houses of Congress (pp. 202-04).
The scope of this book, however, goes far beyond its documentation of what the authors call "the slow strangulation of private-sector
unions" (p. 221). The book's purpose is to paint "a new portrait of
U.S. unionism" (p. 3) based on the analysis of an enormous wealth of
economic data drawn from both the authors' own extensive research
and that of dozens of other scholars in labor economics. The result of
Freeman and Medoff's efforts is the most important and comprehensive treatment of the economics of trade unions to appear in over
twenty years. 5
What Do Unions Do? has already made quite a splash in the industrial relations community 6 and warrants the attention of the legal
community as well. In labor law as much as or more than any other
field of law, it is crucial that policymakers root their decisions in the
economic realities of industrial life. 7 There is a danger, however, that
the legal community will allow this essential integration of labor economics and labor law to be shaped and dominated by the conservative,
laissez-faire approach associated with the law and economics movement. 8 What Do Unions Do?, with its basically positive picture of the
labor movement's role in our economy and its call for more, not less,
governmental protection for the organizing and collective bargaining
activities of unions, can play an important role in reducing that danger. Indeed, that role will undoubtedly be enhanced by the book's
readable style, which makes it accessible to a broad audience without
extensive background in either economics or labor relations.
This review will be in three parts. The first will present a description and evaluation of the book's principal argument, that unions perform a positive role in our economy that at a minimum cancels out,
and probably even outweighs, their negative effects. The second part
4. S. 2467, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See gener·
ally Rosen, Labor Law Reform: Dead or Alive?, 57 U. DET. J. URB. L. 1 (1979).
5. Among Freeman and Medoff's leading precursors are H.G. LEWIS, UNIONISM AND REL·
ATIVE WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES (1963), and A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UN·
IONS (1962 & rev. ed. 1977).
6. See, e.g., Review Symposium-What Do Unions Do? by Richard B. Freeman and James L.
Medoff, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 244 (1985). The book was also the subject of a recent
panel discussion at the 38th annual meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association.
7. As Justice Goldberg once wrote:
[I]n ... fashioning ... a federal law of collective bargaining, it is of the utmost importance
that the law reflect the realities of industrial life and the nature of the collective bargaining
process. We should not assume that doctrines evolved in other contexts will be equally well
adapted to the collective bargaining process.
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 358 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also De!Costello v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172 (1983).
8. E.g., Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor
Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357 (1983); Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. Cm. L.
REV. 988 (1984).
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of this review will focus on some of the book's weaknesses, particularly
its superficial chapter dealing with union democracy and union corruption. The review will conclude with a discussion of the book's implications for contemporary labor law scholarship.
I

The overriding theme of What Do Unions Do? is that unions have
two "faces," one bad and one good: "a monopoly !ace, associated with
[unions'] monopolistic power to raise wages; and a collective voice/institutional response face, associated with their representation of organ-.
ized workers within enterprises." 9 The authors concede that to the
extent unions operate as monopoly institutions 10 they can harm a capitalistic economy in several ways:
First, union-won wage increases cause a misallocation of resources by
inducing organized firms to hire fewer workers, to use more capital per
worker, and to hire workers of higher quality than is socially optimal.
Second, strikes called to force management to accept union demands reduce gross national product. Third, union contract provisions - such as
limits on the loads that can be handled by workers, restrictions on tasks
performed, and featherbedding - lower the productivity of labor and
capital. [p. 14]

On the other hand, the collective voice face of unionism can actually enhance the productivity of enterprises. For example, collectively
bargained seniority rules and grievance procedures have the effect of
reducing quit rates and thereby lowering hiring and training costs (pp.
104-07). 11 The presence of unions also puts pressure on management
to organize production more efficiently in order to preserve profits in
the face of higher wages. And apart from their economic role, unions
provide an important political voice for working people that makes
our political process somewhat more democratic (pp. 15, 18).
But which face predominates? Are critics of the labor movement
correct that the inefficiencies and lowered profit margins associated
with the labor movement's monopoly face make unions costly and unnecessary relics of an earlier era? Or do the benefits associated with
9. Pp. 5-6 (emphasis in original). Freeman and Medoff credit A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE,
(1971), as an inspiration for their analysis of the union movement's collective
voice face. P. 7.
10. They note, however, that "unions are not the simple monopolies of economics textbooks
••. whose sole goal is to maximize profits, regardless of what happens to the number of units
sold." P. 6 (footnote omitted). After all, unions often moderate their wage demands to preserve
jobs. Moreover, unions are often strongest in industries where unionized firms already operate in
a noncompetitive market. Where markets are competitive, unions have much less power to extract monopoly wage gains. P. 7.
11. Union-induced wage increases, of course, also contribute to lower quit rates, so Freeman
and Medoff factored out wage levels in order to determine the extent to which the collective voice
face alone reduces employee turnover costs. P. 95.
AND LoYALTY
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unions' collective voice face reach sufficiently beyond the shrinking
membership of the labor movement to outweigh the costs?
Freeman and Medoff's answer is that the economic costs and benefits of unionism roughly cancel each other out. They estimate that
"union monopoly wage gains cost the economy 0.2 to 0.4 percent of
gross national product, which in 1980 amounted to about ... $20.00
to $40.00 per person" (p. 57). The benefits of lower turnover rates
among unionized employees resulting from unionism's collective voice
face, on the other hand, lower employer costs by one to two percent
(p. 109) 12 and constitute a benefit to unionized employees that translates into a 0.2 to 0.3% annual increase in the gross national product,
or $20.00 to $30.00 per person - nearly the equivalent of the costs
imposed by the monopoly face (p. 110).
Moreover, Freeman and Medoff present a persuasive case that the
benefits of unionism reach far beyond the ranks of organized workers.
Their findings indicate, for example, that when some workers in a firm
obtain higher wages and benefits through unionization, management
tends to extend similar increases to its nonunion employees (p. 151).
This finding is particularly significant because "while only 20 percent
of the U.S. work force has joined a union, more than 50 percent work
for companies that deal with unions" (p. 34). In addition, many large
nonunion firms seek to avoid unionization by paying higher wages and
offering more fringe benefits than they otherwise would. The authors
estimate these increases to be as great as ten to twenty percent (p.
153). Even failed union organizing drives frequently result in wage
and benefit increases for the target employees (p. 155), although these
increases are presumably smaller than those that would have accompanied unionization.
Nevertheless, conservative economists often assert that unions
achieve high wages for their members at the expense of lower-paid
nonunion workers, suggesting that unions are not the egalitarian force
they claim to be. 13 Freeman and Medoff concede that the wages of
some workers are raised at the expense of other workers, but they argue that this increase in inequality "is dwarfed" by a number of other
union wage effects that reduce inequality. Their studies demonstrate,
for example, that union wage policies (1) reduce inequality of wages
within enterprises; 14 (2) promote equal pay for equal work across enterprises; and (3) reduce the wage gap between white-collar and blue12. The authors acknowledge, however, that these savings to employers are smaller than the
upward effect unions have on wages, thus "guaranteeing that firms will not invite organization to
enjoy the benefits of lower turnover." Pp. 109-10.
13. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 124 (1962),
quoted by Freeman & Medoff at p. 16.
14. Unfortunately, the authors do not address the recent trend in many industries toward
collective bargaining agreements providing for "two-tiered" wage plans. See Note, Tivo-Tier
Wage Discrimination and the Duty ofFair Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 631, 632-35 (1985).
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collar workers (p. 78). When these effects are factored into the equation, the evidence indicates that unions reduce wage inequality by
about three percent overall (pp. 90-93).
These and many other findings in What Do Unions Do? were generated by the authors' extensive computer-assisted analyses of a wealth
of raw data collected mostly by others, such as the Census Bureau and
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 15 Although labor economists have
been using similar data for years to examine unions' effects on wages,
:f'.reeman and Medoff are among the first to attempt to quantify the
nonwage effects of unions in order to evaluate unionism's collective
voice face (p. 23).
One of the book's great strengths is the authors' candid acknowledgment of the limits of their discipline's methodology. They claim no
ability to generate controlled experiments with their data that would
permit them to alter one factor while holding all else constant (pp. 23,
44-45). They are careful to qualify their findings when appropriate .
and they freely admit when the data (or their modes of analysis) are
simply insufficient to yield meaningful answers to some of their inquiries.16 Moreover, they repeatedly test their findings against those of
other economists who may have used different models, data, or statistical procedures, explaining that "[i]n the social sciences, it is not exact
duplication of 'experiments' that confirms a finding, but rather similarity of findings under different specifications" (p. 98). Freeman and
Medoff's refreshing pragmatism contributes greatly to their work's
overall credibility.11
A common feature of many empirical studies is that much of what
they prove is the intuitively obvious, and this is certainly true of some
of Freeman and Medoff's findings. For example, they confirm one of
the labor movement's most basic assumptions, that the larger the proportion of workers that is organized in a particular market, the greater
the impact on wages the union is likely to have (p. 51). Another predictable finding is that unions are more likely to make wage concessions when existing wage packages threaten the employment of
substantial numbers of union members (p. 56).
But empirical research has its greatest impact when it disproves or at least calls into question - poorly documented but commonly
15. The book's appendix provides a description of the fourteen data sources most heavily
relied upon. Pp. 253-59.
16. For example, they concede their inability to resolve the debate over the relationship between the union wage differential and the product market power of employers. P. 52. Similarly,
they offer a "guess" that union seniority rules, from an economic standpoint, are on balance
socially beneficial, but they acknowledge that the quantitative evidence is inconclusive. P. 134.
17. In a good example of Freeman and Medofrs nondogmatic approach, they describe two
competing methods of measuring company or industry profitability and then report that they
examined the effects of unionism on both, "on the principle that when one cannot measure the
theoretically correct concept, one does better to look at several indicators, rather than to debate
over which imperfect indicator is 'best.'" P. 182.
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held beliefs. What Do Unions Do? accomplishes this on numerous occasions. For example, it is commonly assumed that union wage gains
are a major cause of inflation, but Freeman and Medoff demonstrate
that union wage increases accounted for only "a minuscule share" of
the inflation between 1975 and 1981 (pp. 58-59). 18 They are careful
not to overstate their conclusion, however, noting that to the degree
nonunion employers emulate union wage patterns, unions are indirectly responsible for some of the inflationary pressures generated in
the nonunion sector (p. 59).
By the authors' own admission, the most controversial - and, to
some commentators, the most counterintuitive19 - of their conclusions is one noted earlier,20 that productivity is frequently higher in
unionized establishments than in otherwise comparable nonunion establishments (p. 180). And, as the authors anticipated, a number of
commentators have criticized either the methodology or the volume of
data relied upon to reach that conclusion.21
Not being an economist, I am reluctant to enter that fray, but there
is one factor that both Freeman and Medoff and their critics seem to
have overlooked, which could lend some support to Freeman and
Medoff's position. That factor is the role unions must play, given the
constraints of modern labor law, 22 in maintaining production by
preventing wildcat strikes and slowdowns and by otherwise helping to
maintain a disciplined workforce. As the Senate committee report on
18. According to the authors' calculations, union wage gains added only "2.3 percentage
points of inflation to the observed 68-point increase in the GNP deflator" during that period. P.
59.
19. E.g.. Posner, supra note 8, at 1000-01 (commenting on Freeman and Medoff articles that
first reported many of the conclusions later incorporated into What Do Ulliolls Do?).
20. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
21. E.g.. Ashenfelter, Book Review, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 245 (1985); Hirsch, Book
Review, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL REV. 247 (1985); Mitchell, Book Review, 38 INDUS. & LAD.
REL. REV. 253 (1985).
22. See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50
(1975) (concerted activity by minority employees unprotected if undertaken outside contractual
grievance procedure); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970)
(grievance strike in violation of no-strike clause may be enjoined); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co.,
370 U.S. 238 (1962) (union that authorizes or participates in strike in breach of no-strike clause
may be liable for damages); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.', 369 U.S. 95 {1962) (nostrike clause will be implied where contract provides for grievance arbitration); Elk Lumber Co.,
91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950) (work slowdown an unprotected activity under the NLRA); Ford Motor
Co., 3 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 779 (1944) (Shulman, Arb.) (employees must obey even unauthorized
employer commands pending completion of grievance process - "obey now, grieve later"), See
gellera/ly J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW {1983); Klare,
Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
65 (D. Kairys ed. 1982); Lynd, The Right to Ellgage ill Collcerted Activity After UlliOll Recoglli·
tioll: A Study of Legislative History, 50 IND. L.J. 720 (1975); Stone, The Post-War Paradigm ill
American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981). For a discussion of the effects of these constraints on a Teamsters local with a militant and surprisingly democratic history, see S. FRIED·
MAN, TEAMSTER RANK AND FILE: POWER, BUREAUCRACY, AND REBELLION AT WORK AND
IN A UNION (1982).
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the Taft-Hartley Act23 put it, "The chief advantage which an employer can reasonably expect from a collective labor agreement is assurance of uninterrupted operation during the term of the
agreement. " 24
The long and often violent history of labor protest in this country
demonstrates that even without unions and without the protection of
federal labor law, aggrieved workers will often strike or otherwise disrupt production in efforts to resolve their grievances and obtain more
control over their workplaces. 25 Thus, the role of modern unions in
curtailing those disruptions must be examined before a complete evaluation of their effect on productivity can be made. 26 Unfortunately,
any effort to quantify that role would necessarily be speculative; simply comparing contemporary strike costs between the union and nonunion sectors would not provide reliable data, because those sectors
which are now heavily unionized may have become unionized precisely because their potential for disruption was great. 27
II

Overall, I found the economic analysis presented in What Do Unions Do? to be exhaustive, persuasive, and - perhaps most important
for noneconomists - comprehensible. Unfortunately, when the authors venture beyond economics into labor law, their work is less satisfactory. For example, they correctly point out that a major factor
contributing to the decline of the labor movement in this country is
the National Labor Relations Act's inability to deter wholesale violations of the Act by companies seeking to defeat union organizing efforts (pp. 230-43). To make this point, however, they slightly
overstate their case by mistakenly assuming that all workers illegally
fired for union activity are fired during or shortly after organizational
23. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1982)).
·
·
24. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 422 (1948). See generally
Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663, 764-71
(1973).
25. See generally I. BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
WORKER, 1933-1941 (1970); J. BRECHER, STRIKE! (1972).
26. Of course, the savings resulting from the role of unions in preventing disruptions must be
reduced by the costs imposed by strikes called by unions. One critic faulted Freeman and Medoff
for failing to give sufficient weight to the costs of union-called strikes, but he too overlooked the
savings resulting from the prevention of disruptions that might have occurred without the union
presence. See Mitchell, supra note 21, at 255 n.11.
27. Cf. F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS 96-175 (1977) (analyzing
the importance of violent labor protests in the trucking, longshore, auto parts, and other now
heavily unionized industries in bringing about the passage of the National Labor Relations Act);
Leigh, Risk Preference and the Interindustry Propensity to Strike, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL REV.
271 (1983) (industries with high injury rates - such as the heavily unionized mining and construction industries - experience a disproportionate number of strikes).
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campaigns (pp. 232-33).28
Similarly, the book treats rather superficially the argument that
collectively bargained seniority systems often have a discriminatory
impact on women and minorities. 29 According to Freeman and
Medoff, black male blue-collar workers have an average of one year
less seniority than their white counterparts, suggesting some disadvantage, but black women have nearly one year more seniority than white
women, implying some advantage. These and other figures lead the
authors to conclude that "[t]he charge that seniority is injurious to
minority economic interests is wrong, because large numbers of minority workers have accrued sufficient seniority to be its beneficiaries" (p.
135). These findings are certainly encouraging, but they are incomplete. They ignore the fact that the jobs in which all too many women
and minorities accumulate that seniority are at the bottom of the economic ladder, 30 and that restrictive interpretations of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 196431 permit the operation of many seniority systems proven to effectively limit minority and female access to, or tenure in, more desirable jobs. 32
Freeman and Medoff's examination of the problems of corruption
and undemocratic practices in the labor movement is even more unsatisfactory. I have no doubt that the conclusions they ultimately reach
28. Freeman and Medoff appear to have borrowed much of their analysis of the NLRA from
Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983), cited by Freeman & Medoff at p. 282 n.12 [hereinafter cited as
Weiler, Promises to Keep], but they fail to note Weiler's reference to NLRB figures indicating
that approximately 10% of the discharges in violation of the Act were unrelated to union organizing efforts. Id. at 1781 n.35. In a more recent article, Weiler cites a General Accounting
Office study indicating that as many as forty percent of the NLRB's discriminatory discharge
complaints were unrelated to union organizing campaigns. Weiler, Striking A New Balance:
Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 356
n.13 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Weiler, Striking a New Balance].
29. See, e.g., w. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS (1977); U.S. COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, LAST HIRED, FIRST FIRED: LAYOFFS AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1977). This criticism
is not meant to deny or minimize the important fact that unionization has shown some tendency
to reduce wage disparities between black and white workers, and between male and female workers. Pp. 48-50.
30. For example, in the generally higher-paying precision production, craft, and repair occupations, blacks hold 7.2% of the jobs and women hold 8.5%. In lower-paying operator,
fabricator, and laborer occupations, however, blacks hold 14.3% of the jobs and women hold
26%. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS
178, 179 (Jan. 1985). Similarly, in the health care field, blacks hold only 7.6% of the registered
nurse jobs but 29% of the nursing aid, orderly, and attendant positions. Id. at 176, 178.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
32. E.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (a seniority
system adopted without the intent to discriminate does not violate Title VII even if it perpetuates
the effects of pre-Act discrimination); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982)
(protection of Teamsters decision extended to seniority systems adopted after effective date of
Title VII); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984) (court may not
modify Title VII consent decree to override operation of seniority system that results in dis pro·
portionate layoffs of minority workers recently hired pursuant to decree•s affirmative action
provisions).
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are valid: that "[t]here is a great deal of democracy ... throughout
the labor movement" and that "the amount of union corruption is no
more than, and probably less than, business corruption" (p. 220). But
this should not be to deny that there are still frequent and serious cases
of autocratic and corrupt rule that affect hundreds of thousands of
union members. 33 Unfortunately, the authors' analysis seems to do
just that, by presenting the reader with a superficial and unjustifiably
rosy picture of the internal affairs of American unions.
For example, Freeman and Medoff correctly report that ''judicial
decisions obligate unions to represent all members fairly" (p. 208), but
they fail to note that in collective bargaining, those decisions give unions almost unlimited discretion to allocate benefits among different
groups of workers, so long as choices are not based on such invidious
criteria as race or sex. 34 In grievance handling, the union's duty of fair
representation is ostensibly more demanding, 35 but my own empirical
research has confirmed the suspicions of a number of commentators36
that the duty "is little more than an empty promise which ultimately
fails to provide workers with meaningful protection from arbitrary,
discriminatory, or perfunctory union conduct." 37
The authors are aware, of course, that paper promises of fair and
democratic treatment, whether contained in statutes, judicial precedents, or union constitutions, do not necessarily guarantee that such
treatment will be delivered (pp. 207-08). Accordingly, they report
other evidence of union democracy, such as survey data indicating reasonably favorable opinions of unions by their members and surprisingly high levels of membership participation in union affairs (pp. 20810). 38 The authors fail to note the findings of another study, however,
33. Freeman and Medoff note, for example, that most union corruption is confined to a small
handful of unions. Pp. 216-17. They fail to point out, however, that one of those unions- the
Teamsters - alone represents nearly ten percent of the unionized, private sector workforce.
DIRECTORY OF U.S. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, 1982-83 EDITION 2-3 (C. Gifford ed. 1982). For a
recent analysis of the extent and nature of union corruption in this country, see PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE EDGE: ORGANIZED CRIME, BUSINESS, AND LABOR
(1986).
34. E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944). See generally Finkin, The Limits ofMajority Rule in Collective Bargaining,
64 MINN. L. REV. 183 (1980).
35. See, e.g., Leffler, Piercing the Duty ofFair Represelllatiim: The Dichotomy Between Negotiations and Grievance Handling, 1979 U. Iu .. L.F. 35, 43; VanderVelde, A Fair Process Model
for the Union's Fair Representation Duty, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1079 (1983).
36. E.g., Tobias, Individual Employee Suits for Breach of the Labor Agreement and the
Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 5 U. ToL. L. REV. 514 (1974).
37. Goldberg, The Duty ofFair Representation: What the Courts Do /11 Fact, 34 BUFFALO L.
REV. 89, 96 (1985). My study found that plaintiffs prevail in fewer than five percent of the duty
of fair representation cases they file, in part because such procedural obstacles as a short limitations period and common requirements that internal union remedies be exhausted preclude plaintiffs from obtaining a hearing on the merits of their claims in approximately 45% of the cases.
Id.
38. For example, the data indicate that within a two-year period, 76% of the union members
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which indicates that self-reported participation in union affairs is frequently exaggerated and is more reliable as a psychological, rather
than a behavioral, variable. 3 9
Leadership turnover is another factor Freeman and Medoff use to
measure the extent of democracy in the labor movement, and they are
correct that turnover rates are relatively high at the local level (p.
211). They are unable to tell us, however, the extent to which this
turnover results from successful challenges to incumbents (or their
designated successors), on the one hand, or merely from the retirements or deaths of the prior officeholders, on the other. In any event,
bargaining, and in some unions even final resolution of grievances,40 is
frequently controlled by the national leadership,41 and at that level, as
Freeman and Medoff acknowledge, officer turnover is lower (p. 211).
Moreover, even what turnover occurs at the national level is typically far removed from membership control. For example, most unions elect their top officials by votes of conventfon delegates (who
themselves are usually officeholders at some level of the union hierarchy) rather than by membership referenda. 42 In addition:
The filling of unscheduled vacancies in the top post often plays a key role
in the continuity of an administration's power. In the large majority of
our American unions, either the executive council appoints a successor
until the expiration of the term of office, or a specified national officer
takes over for this period.... [T]he new or acting president may be very
well entrenched by the time of the next presidential election. 43
surveyed had attended a union meeting; 73% had voted in a union election; and 16% had been
nominated for, elected to, or appointed to a union office. P. 209. These figures, from the 1977
Quality of Employment Survey conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University
of Michigan, seem especially high in light of the fact that local officers are typically elected for
three-year terms, and national officers for five-year terms. If the elections and offices referred to
in the survey include such lower level union positions as shop stewards and membership on
various union committees (that information is not provided), the figures s~em more reasonable.
39. Strauss, Union Government in the U.S.: Research Past and Future, 16 INDUS. REL. 215,
224 (1977). Other studies have indicated that union members are less likely to participate in
union affairs when they perceive the union as satisfying their needs. Anderson, Local Union
Participation: A Re-examination, 18 INDUS. REL. 18, 26 (1979). This raises the possibility that
the survey data relied upon by Freeman and Medoff overstate either the level of membership
participation in union affairs or the level of members' satisfaction with their unions' performance.
40. See, e.g., art. 8, § l(a), National Master Freight Agreement (between the Teamsters
union and most unionized trucking companies, adopted April 1985).
41. See, e.g., J. EDELSTEIN & M. WARNER, COMPARATIVE UNION DEMOCRACY: ORGANISATION AND OPPOSITION JN BRITISH AND AMERICAN UNIONS 20-21 (1975); Roomkin, Union
Structure, Internal Control and Strike Activity, 29 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 198, 199 (1976).
42. D. MCLAUGHLIN & A. SCHOOMAKER, THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT AND UNION DEMOCRACY 24 (1979). For a discussion of the impact of this system on the level of democracy in
the Teamsters union, see Goldberg, Teamsters: More Oligarchy Than Democracy, Philadelphia
Inquirer, May 23, 1983, at 11-A, col. 1.
43. J. EDELSTEIN & M. WARNER, supra note 41, at 101-02. This scenario is by no means
uncommon, as illustrated by the recent mid-term changes in leadership in three of the largest and
most important national unions, the Teamsters, Steelworkers, and AFSCME (public employees).
Serrin, Ohio Leader Named Teamsters' Chief. N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1983, at A20, col. I; Serrin,
Strategist at Helm ofPublic Employee Union, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1981, at 32, col. 2; Steelwork-
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Indeed, the incumbents' overwhelming advantages in contested campaigns for national union office have been well documented. 44
The most serious flaw in Freeman and Medoff's treatment of internal union affairs is their facile assumption that all union elections not
successfully challenged by the Department of Labor pursuant to Title
IV of the Landrum-Griffin Act45 are untainted by improper practices
(pp. 211-12). In fact, Title !V's enforcement procedures are too cumbersome and the Department of Labor's enforcement efforts too passive to justify such a conclusion. The Act vests nearly exclusive
authority in the Secretary of Labor to enforce Title'IV,46 and grants to
the Secretary broad prosecutorial discretion in deciding when to exercise that authority. 47 Unfortunately, the Secretary's enforcement responsibilities are often at odds with his roles as industrial peacemaker
and Administration liaison with organized labor. As a result, political
considerations frequently influence decisions not to prosecute apparent
violations. 48
Moreover, in many cases the Labor Department may be willing
but unable to prosecute, for a number of reasons. For example, enforcement efforts begin only when a union member, after exhausting
internal union remedies, files a complaint with the Department allegers' Secretary in Charge Ulltil Union Election on March 29, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1983, at D18,
col. 6.
44. See generally James, Union Democracy and the LMRDA: Autocracy and Insurgency in
National Union Elections, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 247 (1978) (pointing out that "non-elite
[rank and file] challenges to national union officials are rarely successful even with federal legislation regulating union elections").
45. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA) §§ 401-403, 29
U.S.C. §§ 481-483 (1982). Title IV requires, inter alia: (1) elections of specified union officers at
regular intervals; (2) the eligibility of all members in good standing to run for office, subject to
"reasonable qualifications, uniformly imposed"; (3) reasonable opportunities for every member to
nominate candidates for office; (4) equal opportunities for all candidates to distribute campaign
literature (at their own expense) through use of union membership lists; and (5) fair procedures
for casting and counting votes, including the use of the secret ballot. In addition, all candidates
are prohibited from using union or employer funds or resources in their campaigns. For a comprehensive discussion of Title IV's substantive provisions, see Levy, Electing Union Officers
Under the LMRDA, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 737 (1984).
46. See LMRDA §§ 402(b), 403, 29 U.S.C. §§ 482(b), 483 (1982). There are two principal
exceptions to the Secretary's otherwise exclusive power to remedy election violations. First, Title
IV permits candidates to bring preelection suits to enforce their reasonable requests concerning
the mailing of campaign literature. LMRDA § 401(c), 29 U.S.C. § 481(c). Second, members
may seek preelection relief for certain election-related violations of Title I of the Act (e.g., discriminatory application of eligibility requirements), LMRDA §§ 101-105, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415.
Cf Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 550 (1984) ("If the
remedy sought [for violation of Title I] is invalidation of the election already being conducted
with court supervision of a new election, then union members must utilize the remedies provided
by Title IV.").
47. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
48. See D. MCLAUGHLIN & A. SCHOOMAKER, supra note 42, at 48-50; James, supra note 44,
at 294-313; Rauh, LMRDA-E11force It or Repeal It, 5 GA. L. REV. 643 (1971); Note, Union
Elections and the LMRDA: Thirteen Years of Use and Abuse, 81 YALE L.J. 407, 499-504, 512
(1972).
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ing election irregularities.4 9 If the complainant fails to exhaust internal remedies - perhaps due to missing a short filing deadline50 - the
Department is unable to proceed no matter how serious the alleged
violation. Similarly, many election-related violatio',ns are never prosecuted because the Landrum-Griffin Act requires a finding that a violation "may have affected the outcome of an election" before relief may
be granted.5 1 As one critic of this policy explained:
The final irony is that the greater the damage, the greater the margin of
the incumbent's victory, and the harder it is to ever convince the Secretary that the violations "may have affected the outcome." Thus, there is
reason to advise an incumbent that if he is going to violate Title IV, he
should violate it early and often. 52

My problem with Freeman and Medoff's treatment of internal
union affairs goes beyond its dependence upon unreliable indicators of
union democracy. The authors appear completely insensitive to the
fact that, as "one-party states," unions are inherently prone to oligarchy unless special care is taken to maintain and promote democratic
processes. 53 Much of Freeman and Medoff's favorable analysis of the
collective voice face of unionism rests on the "[g]iven that union decisions are based on a political process in which the majority rules" (p.
16). But as an important article by Alan Hyde has demonstrated,
union decisions in collective bargaining - which for Freeman and
Medoff's purposes are the union decisions of greatest significance are quite often made without extensive or meaningful rank and file
input. 54 Indeed, a substantial proportion of unionized employees have
no right to vote on the collective bargaining agreements governing
their jobs, 55 and those that do often find that right difficult to
enforce. 56
49. LMRDA § 402(a), 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1982). Section 601(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 521(a), authorizes the Secretary to investigate suspected pree!ection violations even without a
union member's formal complaint, but as a general rule that power is not exercised. See D.
McLAUGHLIN & A. SCHOOMAKER, supra note 42, at 56-58.
50. In the Teamsters union, for instance, election protests must be filed within 72 hours of
the election. INTERNATIONAL BHD. OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND
HELPERS OF AMERICA, CONSTITUTION art. XXII, § 5(b) (adopted 1981) [hereinafter cited as
TEAMSTERS CONSTITUTION]. For an excellent discussion of the obstacles to effective Title IV
enforcement from the perspective of rank and file unionists, see H. BENSON, DEMOCRATIC
RIGHTS FOR UNION MEMBERS: A GUIDE TO INTERNAL UNION DEMOCRACY 69-122 (1979).
51. LMRDA § 402(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 482(c)(2) (1982). See D. MCLAUGHLIN & A.
SCHOOMAKER, supra note 42, at 61-62. For an interpretation of this provision that would permit
more aggressive enforcement by the Department of Labor, see Summers, Democracy i11 a 011eParty State: Perspectives from La11drum-Griffi11, 43 Mo. L. REV. 93, 112-13 (1984).
52. James, supra note 44, at 304.
53. See generally Summers, supra note 51 (illustrating how the Landrum-Griffin Act has
been, and should be, construed to meet the special need to provide democracy in a one-party
system).
54. Hyde, Democracy i11 Collective Bargai11i11g, 93 YALE L.J. 793 (1984).
55. Id. at 805.
56. Id. at 810-19. Even when employees can vote on their contracts, the outcome is not
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Freeman and Medoff's superficial and uncritical treatment of internal union affairs is not unusual among supporters of the American
labor movement, many of whom believe that public exposure of union
corruption and autocracy can only play into the hands of the labor
movement's opponents. 57 In my view, anti-union forces will continue
to exploit these shortcomings whether or not supporters of the labor
movement choose to confront them directly. Indeed, it is only by acknowledging and working toward the elimination of these problems
that the labor movement will be able to prevent their further exploitation by anti-union forces. Freeman and Medoff would have done well
to heed the advice of Herman Benson, the executive director of the
Association for Union Democracy:
What we are talking about here is the great paradoxical character of the
American labor movement: on the outside, it is the force for democracy,
social justice and human freedom; but on the inside, it tends to be autocratic. These are the two different sides of the American labor movement. One cannot ignore the realities on the inside, by pointing to the
great things that unions are accomplishing on the outside. There is no
reason for those of us who support the American labor movement to fall
into that trap. 58

III
The shortcomings I have just described are serious, but they
should not be blown out of proportion. Most of them are confined to
only one of the sixteen chapters that comprise What Do Unions Do?,
and it may be no coincidence that that chapter is the only one not
based at least in part on earlier work by Freeman or Medoff. 59 In fact,
one of the book's strengths is precisely that most of it does draw heavily on earlier articles by the authors and a number of their collaborators. As a result, many of its arguments and much of the supporting
data have been carefully reevaluated and refined over time.
What Do Unions Do? will undoubtedly have a significant impact
on labor law scholarship in coming years. Indeed, it is already evident
that scholars purporting to bring economic analysis to bear on labor
law issues must at least acknowledge and respond to the book's treatment of unions, even if they choose not to embrace it fully. A recent
always decided by simple majority rule. In the Teamsters, for example, an employer's final offer
can only be rejected by a two-thirds vote of the membership. TEAMSTERS CONSTITUTION, supra
note 50, art. XII, § 1(b), art. XVI, sec. 4(b).
57. See, e.g., Goldberg, A Trade-Union Point of View, in LABOR IN A FREE SOCIETY 102 (M.
Harrington & P. Jacobs eds. 1959); Wyle, Landrum-Griffin: A Wrong Step in a Dangerous Direction, 13 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 395 (1960).
58. Benson, Union Democracy and the Landrum-Griffin Act, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 153, 184 (1982-83).
59. One wonders whether the chapter was a last minute addition pulled together after the
authors realized that their book would be incomplete without a discussion of internal union
affairs.
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analysis of labor bargaining units, for example, posits three economic
models of union activity and then examines the relationship between
each of those models and the criteria developed by the NLRB for determining appropriate bargaining units under the National Labor Relations Act. 60 One of the three models examined is Freeman and
Medoff's. 61 This is a significant advance over an earlier article by the
same author, which expressly declined to examine "various theories
that challenge the traditional model by suggesting that some union
activity enhances productivity." 62 Even Richard Posner, a strong adherent of the price-auction model of labor markets63 and the traditional monopoly view of unions, recognizes the need to respond to
Freeman and Medoff's very different approach. 64
Economics aside, What Do Unions Do? also serves as a timely reminder to labor law scholars that empirical research can play an important role in complementing the doctrinal and theoretical work
more commonly pursued by legal academics. 65 For example, one of
the great strengths of Paul Weller's recent proposals for the fundamental reform of the National Labor Relations Act is that they are
soundly rooted in an extensive record of empirical evidence - much
of which was initially collected or analyzed by Freeman and Medoff documenting both the failure of the present statutory scheme and the
likely ineffectiveness of less drastic reform alternatives. 66
Indeed, even readers who disagree with Freeman and Medoff's
analysis will undoubtedly find their book an invaluable source of data
- assuming, of course, that such readers have an interest in reality
that goes beyond "some theoretical construct the real world has yet to
witness" (p. 247). To those who do not, 67 the book provides a useful
60. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV. 353 (1984).
61. Id. at 354-60.
62. Leslie, Principles of Labor Antitrust, 66 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1185 n.8 (1980).
63. For a critique of that model, see L. THUROW, DANGEROUS CURRENTS: THE STATE OF
ECONOMICS 173-215 (1983).
64. See Posner, supra note 8, at 1000-01.
65. For more explicit discussions of the importance of empirical research in labor law, see
Dworkin & DeNisi, Empirical Research in Labor Relations Law: A Review, Some Problems, and
Some Directions for Future Research, 28 LAB. L.J. 563 (1977); Empirical Data and Statistical
Analysis in Labor Law, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 1.
66. Weiler, Promises to Keep, supra note 28 (proposing that representation elections be held
immediately upon a union's presentation of authorization cards demonstrating substantial employee interest, thereby minimizing employer opportunities to interfere illegally with union organizing efforts); Weiler, Striking a New Balance, supra note 28 (proposing arbitration of the first
collective agreement for newly organized workers as a remedy for egregious bad-faith bargaining,
and proposing that prohibitions against secondary boycotts in bargaining disputes be partially
lifted). Weiler's work also includes a short but effective defense brief on behalf of collective
bargaining which draws heavily upon the economic research of Freeman and Medoff. Weiler,
Promises to Keep, supra note 28, at 1823-27.
67. See, e.g., Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984);
Epstein, supra note 8 (both arguing on libertarian and efficiency grounds for deregulation of the
employment relationship). For commentary on these articles highlighting Epstein's failure to
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antidote.
On the other hand, the limitations of empirical research must be
recognized. As Freeman and Medoff succinctly put it, "Age-old debates do not often end with a bang, even with computerized evidence"
(p. 180). 68 To be sure, What Do Unions Dof is a major achievement,
and its findings provide support~rs of the labor movement with the
facts and figures they need to respond to the oft-repeated claim that
unions are a drag on the economy that society can no longer afford.
But in the end, the strongest case for unionism has never been that
unions pay for themselves. Efficiency is not the only value in the employment relationship, and to give it too much weight is to allow the
proponents of the law and economics movement to monopolize the
debate over the future of American labor law. 69
Freeman and Medoff's greatest achievement is in identifying the
features of unionism's collective voice face; their effort to quantify the
value of those features is in my view less successful but also less important. After all, unions at their best seek to bring to the workplace not
only improved wages and working conditions but a model of industrial
democracy and human dignity that is impossible to measure in dollars
and cents. Thus, suggestions that workers would be just as well off
under a system that established decent standards of employment
through social legislation alone, without collective bargaining, 70 overlook completely the value of enabling workers to participate collectively and effectively in the decisions controlling their working lives.
Equally important, unions provide a collective voice to workers
address the empirical and historical evidence contradicting his argument, see Finkin, ''In Defense
of the Comract at Will"-Some Discussion Comments and Questions, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 727
(1985); Getman & Kohler, The Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Response to Professor
Epstein, 92 YALE L.J. 1415 (1983); Verkuil, Whose Common Law for Labor Relations?, 92 YALE
L.J. 1409 (1983).
68. Certainly the authors of Union Representation Elections: Law and Reality, one of the
best-known and most controversial empirical studies in labor law, would agree with this statement. See J. GETMAN,
GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS:
LAW AND REALITY (1976). Ten years after publication of their study, the debate still rages over
the validity of its conclusions. Compare Dickens, The Effects of Company Campaigns on Certification Elections: Law and Reality Once Again, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL REV. 560 (1983); Freeman & Medoff, pp. 236-37; and Weiler, Promises to Keep, supra note 28, at 1782-86, with
Goldberg, Getman & Brett, The Relationship Between Free Choice and Labor Board Doctrine:
Differing Empirical Approaches, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 721 (1984).
69. Cf. Peritz, The Predicamellt of Antitrust Jurisprudence: Economics and the Monopolization ofPrice Discrimination Argument, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1205 (describing and criticizing the domination of one aspect of antitrust analysis by the law and economics approach). The literature
critiquing the law and economics movement is extensive. See, e.g., Baker, Starting Points in
Economic Analysis ofLaw, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 939 (1980); Bebchuk, The Pursuit ofa Bigger Pie:
Can Everyone Expect a Bigger Slice?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 671 (1980); Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (1980); Leff, Economic Analysis of Law:
Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974); Tribe, Constitutional Calculus:
Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592 (1985).
70. See, e.g., Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the
Curre/lt State of Labor Law and Its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012 (1984).
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not only in the workplace, but in the political arena as well (pp. 191206). Along with the civil rights movement, the labor movement is
the most important and best organized segment of the polity that has
struggled consistently for a more equitable distribution of wealth and
power in this society. True, the traditions of bread and butter unionism in this country are a far cry from the political unionism of western
Europe, 71 but as one commentator has put it: "The AFL-CIO may be
... relatively weak and relatively nonideological ... , but there is no
doubt that in its absence the pressures by corporations and affluent
individuals to widen tax privileges still further, extract government
subsidies, and assist the unneedy, would be entirely successful, instead
of only mostly successful." 72
71. See generally European Labor and Politics (pts. 1 & 2), 28 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3,
203 (1974-75).
72. R. LEKACHMAN, ECONOMISTS AT BAY 204 (1976).

